As time passed following the change of regime in Syria, the "Israeli" attacks on Syria shifted from assaults aimed at undermining the state's capabilities to what resembles messages to other parties, foremost among them Turkey, warning of a potential escalation from tension between the latter and the occupying state to direct confrontation.

The strategic environment for the Zionist occupation state has changed significantly after October 7, 2023; its security system has collapsed and declared its failure in the face of Palestinian resistance. It has clearly directed its efforts towards undermining any potential threat, even if far in the future, under the slogan "redrawing the maps in the Middle East.

In the context of Syria, the previous model that the occupying state interacted with has collapsed, characterized by strikes and assassinations from time to time. A new leadership has emerged, about which little is known, and which has not been confronted before. Therefore, there are no known rules of engagement between them. Furthermore, developments have practically, albeit not officially, placed both Turkey and the occupying state on flexible borders with one another.

The fall of the Assad regime and the coming of the new Syrian administration led by Ahmed al-Sharaa have significantly deepened the conflict of interests between Turkey and the occupying state. The latter seeks a weak and fragmented Syria, favoring scenarios of division and fragmentation based on ethnic, sectarian, and regional lines. It views the new leadership in Syria with suspicion, even inciting against them as "terrorists," and claims to protect certain minorities while calling for cooperation with them against both the Syrian leadership and Turkey.

In contrast, Ankara sees the stability of Damascus and the unity of its territory as a paramount interest, far beyond the many economic and commercial interests that would arise from a change of regime, as well as the issue of refugees. More importantly, it views the transitional phase and the new administration positively and is striving diligently to garner support for it, lift sanctions from it, and open up avenues for relations between it and various countries.

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The Zionist occupation views Turkey as one of the most significant obstacles to its strategy in Syria, which necessitates the need to work against it.

Among the most important considerations for Ankara is its suspicion and accusation against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces due to their ties with the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). It has repeatedly declared its readiness to intervene militarily against them if they pursue separatist projects. Meanwhile, the occupying government speaks about them in terms of an ally that should be cooperated with against Turkey. Communication took place between them during and after the "Deterring Aggression" operation.

As a result of all the above, the occupying state views Turkey as one of the most important obstacles to its strategy in Syria, which necessitates the need to work against it.

Indicators of Collision

From the very first moments of the fall of the Assad regime, and during the "Deterrence of Aggression" operation, the occupying state began implementing a scenario to undermine the capabilities of the Syrian state and destroy any cards of power in its hands, through bombarding heavy weapons, military bases, and research centers, in addition to its incursion into Syrian territory after declaring the collapse of the 1974 disengagement agreement.

In the face of this ongoing aggression, Turkey has repeatedly stated that "Israel" has become the primary and largest threat to the security and stability of the region, urging it to stop its attacks on Syria. The situation then developed to direct statements from President Erdoğan indicating that those who target Syria's stability will find us in confrontation, signaling a possible change in Ankara's position.

The statements came after the "Israeli" airstrikes that targeted several Syrian military sites, including the T4 base and airport near Homs, as well as Hama airport and several sites near Damascus. These intensive airstrikes followed reports of a Syrian request and a Turkish interest in a Turkish military presence at some military sites, including the T4 base, along with other reports indicating that Turkish technical delegations had visited the location to discuss requirements.

Therefore, this time the raids were interpreted differently; that is, beyond the idea of undermining the capabilities of the Syrian state, they also included direct messages to Turkey to reconsider its military presence in Syria, especially since ministers in the occupying government warned that the opening of Syrian territory to parties that could target "Israel," as they expressed, would primarily concern Ankara.

Perhaps all of this indicates a fundamental change in the perspectives of both Turkey and "Israel" towards each other following the significant changes in Syria. Turkey had condemned the aggression on Gaza, labeled "Israel" as a state of terrorism, and reduced its relations with it. However, developments in Syria have led Turkey to view it as a direct threat. On the "Israeli" side, the "Nagle" committee warned the occupation government of a potential military clash with Turkey in the coming years. On the Turkish side, Erdoğan threatened the possibility of using force later to support the Palestinians, to which the "Israelis" responded by warning him of a fate similar to that of Saddam Hussein.

Does the change in the security doctrine of the occupying state (Israel) extend to Turkey and push it to target it directly?

Motivations for understanding

Despite the reasons that may lead to a confrontation between Turkey and the Zionist entity and the numerous indications of increasing tension between them recently, there are many obstacles that act as brakes on the idea of direct confrontation between them.

The first and major obstacle is the significant cost for both parties in the event of a direct military confrontation between them, as they both possess large armies that are the strongest among the countries in the region. This makes the consequences of military confrontation between them substantial and potentially catastrophic, which leads both sides to be very cautious in this regard. Anyone who closely follows Hebrew media can clearly observe the strong presence of this sentiment there.

The statements of political analysts in the entity are rich with distinctions between Iran – which was the opposing forces present in Syria – and Turkey, not only in terms of military power, but also in the structure of the state and its foreign relations, particularly with the United States, its perspective on relations with "Israel," and the history of those relations, in addition to its membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Despite the strong reasons that may drive direct confrontation between Turkey and "Israel," there are factors that prevent this clash.

NATO membership, specifically, serves as a key restraining factor in the potential confrontation between the two sides. The United States would not want a direct clash between two of its allies in the region, especially as it seeks to calm the situation there in order to focus more on competition with China. This has been evident in recent years and has been further reinforced by the opportunities that have arisen for Ankara following the radical change in Damascus and its increasing significance to Washington regarding Syria and overall regional issues. This is illustrated by statements made by President Donald Trump during his meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at the White House, which included a positive outlook on Turkey and Erdogan, along with his offer to Netanyahu to mediate any issues with Turkey, even conditioning it on being rational.

Turkey has confirmed that it does not seek a direct confrontation with "Israel," as stated by its Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan. However, this does not mean that it will submit to the logic of threats and aggressive messages from Israel. Turkey is following a strategy that relies on several tracks: the first is calming tensions and reaffirming the desire to avoid confrontation; the second is to count on a U.S. role in pressuring "Israel" and curbing its aggressive tendencies; while the third involves imposing facts on the ground that would be difficult to reverse and that challenge the situation in the long term.

While the fourth path lies in trying to weave understandings with "Israel" to avoid direct confrontation in Syria, similar to the agreements that existed among the various parties with forces present on Syrian territory, especially between Turkey, Iran, and Russia. Media reports have mentioned that dialogues have taken place between the two sides for this purpose, although no tangible results have been achieved yet.

Therefore, the factors straining bilateral relations remain present, chief among them the aggressive policies of the occupying state in Syria and the region, including Turkey of course, which keeps the possibilities of conflict in the long term alive, even if they are currently very weak, regardless of the form of the conflict, its objectives, scope, and outcomes.

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